Policy rules . . . anticipate that key causal connections observed in the past will remain fixed over time. . . . But we have found that very often historical regularities have been disrupted by unanticipated change. . . . The evolving patterns mean that the performance of the economy under any rule, were it to be rigorously followed, would deviate from expectations. . . . In an ever changing world, some element of discretion appears to be an unavoidable aspect of policymaking.
Alan Greenspan (1997) The Greenspan era (1987 Greenspan era ( -2006 has been a good period for both the practice and the product of monetary policy in the United States. Of the two, outcomes are of course easier to measure. Price inflation has been mostly low and consistently stable. The volatility of output and employment has likewise been limited by historical standards with two business recessions, both short and both of modest magnitude, over 18 years. Market interest rates have shown little volatility as well, and the nation's financial markets weathered both the collapse of the thrift industry in the late 1980s and the 2001-2003 stock market decline, with little sense of real threat to either the functioning of markets or the integrity of well-managed institutions. Changes in the practice of monetary policy are harder to document, although some changes made during these years are also easily visible. Most obvious, perhaps, have been steps toward increased transparency of the Central Bank's actions. As of 1987, the policy directives adopted at each meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) were released to the public only after three months, and even then the public statement contained no explicit reference to any specific level of the federal funds rate that the Committee sought to impose. Today the Committee's interest rate target is announced at the conclusion of each meeting, with edited minutes being released three weeks later.
The more important change in policy practice, however-indeed, what stands out from the Greenspan era as a whole, in retrospecthas been the ongoing movement away from mechanistic restrictions on the conduct of monetary policy, together with a willingness, on occasion, to depart even from what more flexible guidelines dictated by contemporary conventional wisdom would imply, in the interest of carrying out the Federal Reserve System's dual mandate to pursue both stable prices and maximum employment.
Although the FOMC had stopped setting a growth target for the narrow M1 money stock after 1986, the Committee was, at least as a formal matter, still formulating policy in terms of a targeted growth rate for the broader M2 aggregate when Alan Greenspan assumed the chairmanship in 1987. There is also evidence that in the late 1980s the money-growth target was not a mere formality, but rather played a significant role in influencing the Committee's setting of the federal funds rate.
1 That influence steadily waned, however, and in 1993 the Committee "downgraded" its M2 target. Thereafter the Committee continued to set a range for M2 growth (and M3 as well, along with a credit aggregate), but it made clear that such ranges were merely "intended to communicate its expectation as to the growth of these monetary aggregates that would result" under specified assumed conditions. By 1998, the Committee stated that it was setting such ranges "not as expectations for actual money growth, but rather as benchmarks for M2 and M3 behavior that would be consistent with sustained price stability, assuming velocity change in line with pre-1990 historical experience" (emphasis added). More specifically, they were not "guides to pol-icy." Beginning in 2001, the Committee stopped setting such ranges altogether.
The more substantive demonstration of flexibility in pursuit of the Federal Reserve's dual objective came in the conduct of actual monetary policy, beginning in the mid-1990s. After peaking at 7.8 percent in mid-1992, unemployment had declined as the new business expansion gained strength. In September 1994, the rate fell below 6 percent. Unemployment had been below 6 percent throughout 1988 and 1989, in a period when inflation was moving steadily upward-from 2.7 percent in 1987 to 3.4 percent in 1988, 3.8 percent in 1989, and 4.8 percent per annum in the first half of 1990; hence the FOMC's action, beginning in the spring of 1988, to raise the federal funds rate by some 225 basis points in the lead-up to what became the 1990 -1991 recession. In 1994, likewise, the Committee began to raise the federal funds rate, moving from just 3 percent at the beginning of the year to 5.5 percent by year's end and to 6 percent by mid-1995.
Unlike when the Federal Reserve had tightened policy six years earlier, however, the economy did not slow. Output continued to grow, by 2.5 percent in 1995, then 3.7 percent in 1996, and 4.5 percent in 1997. Nonfarm payrolls expanded by 3 million in 1995, 2.4 million in 1996, and 3 million again in 1997. With an ongoing increase in labor force participation as well, the share of the adult population formally employed rose to a record high (even higher than at the peak of World War II, including men and women in uniform). Unemployment continued to decline, falling below 5 percent in May 1997-for the first time since 1973, infamously the beginning of the worst increase in inflation in U.S. post-war experience. But also unlike previous experience, not just in the 1970s but also in the years leading up to the 1990 -1991 recession, this time, rapid economic expansion and declining unemployment did not bring increased inflation. Instead, inflation gradually but steadily slowed, from 2.1 percent in 1994 to 2.0 percent in 1995, then to 1.9 percent in 1996 and 1.7 percent in 1997.
But shouldn't inflation have increased? The conventional wisdom of the economics profession at that time certainly thought so. Numerous papers of the time investigating the nexus between potential and actual output, the labor market, and inflation-by Robert J. Gordon (1997) , Kenneth N. Kuttner (1994) , and Douglas Staiger et al. (1997) , among others-came to the conclusion that if the economy's natural rate of unemployment was below 6 percent, it was not much below. The implication for monetary policy was clear. Allowing output to expand at such a rate that unemployment had fallen increasingly below 6 percent was, at best, risky. Allowing unemployment increasingly below 5 percent would surely be inflationary.
Yet the FOMC did not act. Indeed, even as unemployment was falling the Committee had cut the federal funds rate from 6 percent at midyear 1995 to 5.5 percent by the time unemployment crossed through the 5 percent mark. A year later, with unemployment now down to 4.4 percent, the funds rate was still 5.5 percent. After a further, quickly reversed cut at the time when the Asian financial crisis became especially worrisome, the rate remained 5.5 percent at the beginning of 2000, by which time unemployment stood at just 4.0 percent.
One early anticipation of this unorthodox sequence of policy decisions (and, more directly, of the underlying economics of the situation) was an article, signed by Greenspan personally, that appeared in the Wall Street Journal in October 1988, back when unemployment had also been below 6 percent and increasing inflation was of concern to monetary policymakers. 2 Greenspan's central theme was "the marked downsizing of economic output," not just in America, but throughout the industrialized world. Greenspan wrote, "The creation of economic value in recent decades has shifted toward conceptual values-that is, those created by new scientific insights and technology-with far less reliance on physical volumes." Viewed in retrospect, with an eye in particular to understanding the rationale underlying the willingness, a decade later, to gamble that extraordinary economic growth and low unemployment would not prove inflationary, two implications of this "downsizing" phenomenon stand out as especially salient: first, the growing economic importance of information technology-in Greenspan's words, "the explosive growth in information gathering and processing techniques, which have greatly increased our ability to substitute ideas for physical volume" (and, one might add, for human inputs to production as well); and second, the greater exposure of ever more sectors of economic activity to international competition-"the increased ease with which economic goods and services can spill over national borders." Did Greenspan anticipate the speed-up of U.S. productivity growth and the economy's ability to achieve rapid output growth and low unemployment without increased inflation, nearly a decade before either became a reality? As of 1988, output per hour in the economy's nonfarm business sector had advanced by 1.6 percent per annum over the prior two decades. During the period 1988 -1995, productivity growth averaged only 1.5 percent. But in the latter half of the 1990s the average pace increased to 2.5 percent (and since then it has jumped to 3.4 percent). The noninflationary consequences of unemployment consistently below 6 percent after mid-1994 and then, for more than four years beginning in late 1997, below 5 percent, represented a similar departure. Was the Wall Street Journal article prescient? Was the monetary policy that followed a decade later a consequence?
The answer remains unclear. And it is likewise unclear to what extent the nonmechanical monetary policy of the Greenspan era was responsible for the favorable economic outcomes that ensued. Olivier Blanchard and John Simon (2001) , for example, concluded that while systematic factors (not just smaller shocks) have partly accounted for the reduced volatility of both output and inflation in recent years, improved monetary policy is not among them. Similarly, Athanasios Orphanides (2003) has shown that the systematic component of U.S. monetary policy in the Greenspan era did not differ significantly from that of earlier times, when outcomes were far less favorable-in particular, the inflationary 1970s.
3 But even if the systematic components of monetary policy bear little responsibility for the improved outcomes, or have themselves changed little from prior periods, what, nonetheless, stands out in the Greenspan era, and especially from the mid1990s onward, is the nonmechanistic flexibility that allowed a forward-looking policy to anticipate what, in retrospect, plainly turned out to be different economic circumstances.
Will this flexibility survive Greenspan's service as chairman? Or will U.S. monetary policy now begin to retrace the steps it has traveled in the last two decades (beginning in the later Paul Volcker years) along the "rules versus discretion" spectrum?
The cutting edge of the current movement to send monetary policy back in the direction of "rules" is the increasingly widespread support for inflation targeting. 4 Although some more elaborate inflation targeting regimes, like that proposed by Lars E. O. Svensson (2005) , are fully consistent with the kind of flexible approach to policymaking that has been characteristic of the Greenspan era, many others are not. The argument for "rules," in terms of implications for the public's expectations of and confidence in future monetary policy and economic outcomes, requires that such rules be simple to enunciate and easy to understand. A further concern is that announcing a numerical target for the "price stability" part of the U.S. Central Bank's dual mandate, but not the "maximum employment" part, will not only result in a less flexible form of monetary policymaking, but will also undermine the Federal Reserve's commitment to the part of that mandate for which there is no numerical target.
5 Policymakers inevitably assume greater responsibility for outcomes for which they are held accountable, and (as the experience with money growth targets clearly demonstrated) a publicly disclosed numerical target achieves precisely this purpose.
The Greenspan era, therefore, may stand as the modern-day pinnacle of "discretion," rather than "rules," in U.S. monetary policymaking. The record of economic performance that it
